WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPT OF A RELATIONAL VALUE - ETHICS

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If the following definition of communitarianism is correct, then Whitehead's ethics is close to communitarianism:

"If I am a member of a community, I conceive of the goals and values I share with my fellows as essentially our goals and values, not just as goals and values that happen to be the same for all of us because of a contingent convergence of our individual interests. Each member thinks of furthering the community's ends primarily as gains for us, not as a gain for themselves that happens to be accompanied by similar gains for other individuals in the group. In the activities that are the life of the community, individuals think of themselves first and foremost as members of the group. Thus, at least in the course of these activities, the distinction between what is in your interest, as opposed to mine or ours, breaks down or recedes into the background." (cf. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Whitehead's relational value ethics is an attempt to overcome the individualistic approach towards ethics, since it stresses the relation between "beings'" as all important. These relations are focused towards goals that in traditional terms are called values. These relations can be looked at a micro level (families, other nuclear groups) as well as at the macro level: nation, community etc. Therefore, one can draw close similarities to an Aristotelean concept of virtue (justice, fortitude etc.).

I. Reality as a value process
Reality as process is directed at an aim. Each process reaches satisfaction at its end: in traditional terms, a value has become real.
A basic contrast in reality is that of good and evil.
„In our cosmological construction we are, therefore, left with the final opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction – that is to say, the many in one – flux and permanance, freedom and necessity, God and the World."(PR 341)
Whitehead conciders reality as a complex structure of relations.(AI 253)
„It is held that every qualitative factor in the Universe is primarily a qualification of subjective form, so that the infinite variety of qualities involves the possibilitiy of an infinite variety of forms exemplifying those qualities."
The structure of the micro- and macro-processes can be judged by aesthetic criteria despite the fact that they originate from subjective forms.
„All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order and the aethetic order is derived from the immanence of God." (RM 101)
Or, in other words, „The real world is good when it is beautiful."(AI 268)
Good and evil are realised values in an actual world and can therefore be described and judged by aesthetic criteria. Whitehead developed this in the 4th part of AI. He introduces an aestheic teleology and says: „The teleology of the Universe of experience is directed to the production o Beauty." (AI265) This does not imply a naive or even sophisticated form of optimism or belief in moral progress. Reality is always process, it cannot be static. But for humanity as well as for the cosmos as a whole, one has to notice: „ The foundation of all

understanding of sociological theory ...is that no static maintenance of perfection is possible...Advance or Decadence are the only choices offered to mankind." (AI 274)

R.M.Millard has tried to develop a fixed order of forms of importance. For SMW and RM he extracts 7 categories of importance.

1. Harmoniuos individuality
2. Endurance
3. Morality
4. Contrast
5. Depth
6. Vividness or Intensity
7. Personality. (Millard, 175)

The mere fact though that he develops a different set of categories for AI and MT seems to prove the opposite of a fixed set of categories. It is still worth taking note of them:

The lower intrinsic values are:

1. Minor beauty
2. survival

The higher intrinsic values are:

3. Freedom
4. Moral goodness
5. Understanding
6. Holiness

The highest intrinsic values are:

7. Truth
8. Major beauty
9. Adventure
10. Civilisation
11. Peace.

Especially the last five values are particularly plausible, since they correspond to the last part of AI. But, all in all, one has to conclude that Truth, Beauty, Adventure and Art are not set in a hierarchical order, but are rather linked on similar levels depending on their locus of realisation.

According to Whitehead a general measure of values can be „importance". Whitehead can also call it depth of experience. „Various occasions are thus comparable in respect to their relative depth of actuality." (RM 100)

The world of value and the world of fact, therefore, cannot be seperated, but can be distunguished. „The prime characteristic of one world is change, and of the other world is immortality." (ESP 97)

Since every fact in the World of Activity has a positive relevance to the whole range of the world of Value, evaluation refers to omissions and admissions

„Evaluation involves a process of modificaion: the World of Activity is modified by the World of Value."(ESP 89)

Importance can be distinguished according to its intensity and its contrasts.

a) Intensity

Whitehead uses this term at several places without a detailed analysis. But one can say that intensity is related to the subjectivity of feeling, while contrast hints at the objective form of a process, its order or structure.

Perfection of a subjective form is defined in detail and final synthesis."..In the sense here meant, Strength has two factors, namely, variety of detail with effective contrast, which is Massiveness, and Intensity Proper..(AI 253)

Actual entities can be compared regarding its intensity. Like a fugue by Bach intensity culminates if more and more different elements get combined into a whole of subjective feeling, and the intensity of each element inreases: that of the single melody as much as that of the whole fugue.

   b) Contrasts

"Such is the nature of existence: it is the acquisition of pattern by feeling, in its emphasis on a finite group of selected particulars which are the entities patterned… Each entity in a pattern enters into other patterns, and retains its own individuality in this variety of existence." (ESP 119)

Only the analysis of the form, the change and the duration of an entity enables one to determine and actualize the good.

For this determination mathematics plays an important role.

"Mathematics is the most powerful technique for the understanding of pattern, and for the analysis of the relationship of patterns." (s.a.)

Besides the pattern or structure of experience feeling plays an important role as well: feeling being the subjective side of each experience. "our experience of actuality is a realization of worth, good or bad. It is a value experience." (MT 116)

In order to compare structures, one needs aesthetic criteria. Beauty is for Whitehead not primarily a judgement of pieces of art, like paintings etc., but of acts of experience, which, of course, include the experience of art. "Thus in a primary sense Beauty is a quality which finds its exemplification in actual occasions: or put conversely, it is a quality in which occasions can severally participate." (AI 252)

Beauty, in this sense, can only be achieved when the occasions involved aim at harmony and contrast or, it might be more adequate to say: harmony in contrast.

Most harmonious and most dull would be a sound like that of a siren. Monotonous and not thrilling at all when it is meant to be an entertaining sound. Of course - in a different set up - it can be most thrilling: e.g. when used as a sign of a bomb alarm.

If I hear very different sounds, which I cannot synthezise, I don't understand them and, therefore, the intensity of feeling gets lost, while the intensity towards the producer of such 'noises' becomes the focus of my feeling. (The common man's attitude towards modern music or that of parents to the 'loud' music of their kids)

The more contrasting details are integrated into one feeling, the higher its intensity. Whitehead takes the sculpture and the tracery of the Cathedral of Chartres to explain this :

"They lead the eye upward to the vaulting above, and they lead the eye horizontally to the supreme symbolism of the altar.They claim attention by their beauty of detail. Yet they shun attention by guiding the eye to grasp the significance of the whole…. Each detail claims a permanent existence for its own sake, and then surrenders it for the sake of the whole composition."(AI 282)

But even a feeling of highest perfection and intensity is haunted by finitude. (s.AI 276)

II. The limits of the value process

The realization of value necessarily involves elimination of other possibilities. The creative act , the emergence of something new can only be achieved by setting a goal and thereby excluding others from their realization/actualization.

Human societies necessarily invole forms of exclusion: "The crystals are not agencies requiring the destruction of eleborate societies derived from the environment; a living society is such an agency. The societies which it destroys are its food. This food is destroyed by dissolving it into somewhat simpler social elements. It has been robbed of something." (PR 105)

In addition to the conflicts of organisms with their environment, organisms face conflicts with the future, in so far as certain aims will be chosen others excluded.

In the process of actualisation, one will always find elements of disharmony as well.

Perfect harmony seems necessarily based on certain form of negation ."Progress is founded upon the experience of discordant feelings….Perfections of diverse types are among themselves discordant…Thus the value of Discord is a tribute to the merits of Imperfection." (AI 257)

Intensity is achieved by the highest possible contradiction which can be synthesized into one feeling. [1] Intensity requires constant emergence of new discords which can or can not be synthezised.

If the sythesis fails, the different elemets are incommensurable, Whitehead calls that triviality. The actual fact of incommensurability should not be underestimated. What is easily understood regarding the fine arts applies eaqually to history: "History can only be understood by seeing it as the theatre of diverse groups of idealists respectively urging ideals incompatible for conjoint realization"(AI 276/277)

If the synthesis can be reached too easily, one has another form of triviality.

III. Morality

A) Good

Organisms which are conscious, organisms which therefore consciously choose goals and try to achieve them can be made responsible for their actions.

"The subject is responsible for being what it is in virtue of its feelings. It is also responsible for the consequences of its existence because they flow from its feelings." (PR 222)

Each subject has a three - dimensional freedom: freedom from its past, freedom from contemporaries and freedom from the future. While, on the elementary level, the interrelationship between events has to be described as causality, it has to be described at the highest level, i.e. conscious subjects as self-determination.

This threefold freedom is limited, though, in a threefold manner: by its past, by its contemporaries and by its future. The frame of self-determination is always given to each actual entity.

In an abstract manner, one can determine morally good and evil by the criteria of intensity and contrast. (s.O.)

Whitehead did this in his earlier works. It was only in AI that he developed a historical critique of Ideas, which lead to good or evil.

The guiding Ideals for civilization are, according to Whitehead, Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art and Peace.

Science and Art unite truth and beauty. "Science and Art are the consciously determined pursuit of Truth and of Beauty. In them the finite consciousness of mankind is appropiating as its own the infinite fecundity of nature." (AI 272)

Art, in a broad, sense plays a special role in civilisation . Since Art and civilisation both aim at intensity of feeling in harmony , Whitehead uses both interchangeably. Since Art grants individuality to its different components (AI282) and does not use force, it can be a model for modern ethics and political theory. "The creation of the world- that is to say, the world of civilized order – is the victory of persuasion over force." (AI 25)

Modern society has to minimize its use of force to the absolutely necessary minimum and has to rely more and more on persuasion. "The progressive societies are those which most decisively have trusted themselves to the fourth factor which is the way of persuasion." (AI 85)

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[1] See Wiehl, contrasts in H.Holz 1984, 315-341

Adventure is absolutely necessary for every society, because, otherwise, it would miss out on grasping higher forms of harmony and so disintegrate.

This can only be achived best, if these societies grant tolerance to its members. Only then can new ideas and goals be developed and realized. "The duty of tolerance is our finite homage to the abundance of inexhaustible novelty which is awaiting the future, and to the complexity of accomplished fact which exceeds our stretch of insight."(AI 52)

Only 'brotherhood' can be the basis of moral progress. (AI29/30).

These basic principles: Truth, Beauty, Art and Adventure need a final link to exclude rigorous egoism, inconsiderate and ruthless action. Whitehead calls this link, which, to some extent, turns the former order of these ideas upside down, Peace. (AI 285) He is not referring to political feedom, but to 'a quality of mind steady in its reliance that fine action is treasured in the nature of things'. (AI 275)

As in love, which breaks down 'the narrow self-regarding motives' (AI 288), peace 'carries with it a surpassing of personality'. (AI 285) It contains something like 'a grasp of infinitude, an appeal beyond boundaries'. The experience of peace is 'largely beyond control of purpose'. "It comes as a gift."(AI 285)

Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise

(That last infirmity of noble mind) (Milton, Lycidas 71) Behind this is the notion that this singular actual occasion is the central actuality 'claiming all things as its own'. (AI 288) Here lies the origin of evil.

The experience of peace is based on experiencing the adventures of the universe as one. "This Adventure embraces all particular occasions but as an actual fact stands beyond any one of them. It is, as it were, the complement to Plato's Receptacle, its exact opposite…(AI 295)

The Ideas Truth Beauty , Adventure and Peace are astonishingly close to the classic doctrine of virtues,namely justitia, temperantia, fortitudo and prudentia.

Truth and Beauty together are the aesthetic criteria to determine the suum cuique; justice, understood as the true relationships of occasions, gives birth to Beauty and correspondes to the classic definition of justitia distributiva.[2]

The first and original meaning of temperantia is to construct an ordered unity out of divergent parts. Whitehead defines Beauty as 'the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience'.(AI 252) Temperantia, therefore, can be understood in Whitehead's terms as that form of Beauty, which can arrrive in comlex forms of experience, e.g. a human being.

For Whitehead, it is of central importance, that there can be no static form of human life, static life is a contradiction in terms. "There is no halt in which the actuality is just its static self, accidentally played upon by qualifications derived from the shift of circumstances." (AI 274/275)

The correlate to this dynamic concept of reality is fortitudo (bravery).

Bravery implies, as its actus principalior, withstanding evil, but it does not exclude activity; on the contrary, it includes a 'dynamic grasping 'of the good.[3]

To conceive every process of reality implies that bravery can only grasp the good in a way which cannot aim at a static preseverance a particular state.

This does not mean that complex societies need a certain form in order for them to function. No civilisation can exist without a well - developed system of relation, because a stable order is necessary for it , though that cannot be sufficient for a society to function.[4]

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[2] See Pieper 1964, 119ff.
[3] See Pieper, 181
[4] See AESP

Prudentia plays a special role within the framework of virtues. It informs the other values, gives them their inner essential form [5]. The measure and norm of prudentia is the fact itself (ipsa res). Realisation of the virtues may be misguided, if focused exclusively on human action. The meaning of wisdom (prudentia) is the correlation to the truth of things (Pieper 36).

Wisdom and the other virtues are interdependent: only the one who is wise can be just, brave and moderate; only the one who is already just, brave and moderate can be wise. The presupposition of the argument is a primordial affirmation of the good as the final telos of human action. "A person can only be wise, if he has been and still is loving the good; only a wise person can do good. And because the love of the good is increasing in doing it the virtues empower each other mutually while being actualised.

In its highest form, prudentia reaches a point where it, to a certain extent, disregards the created things of the world. This is re ached by the inner link of being to God, born out of love. (Pieper 63) And even this wisdom has no other meaning but to 'give moderation and direction to the human will and acting through experiencing the deep- rooted truth of the reality of both,

God and the world. (pieper 63/63)

Whitehead's notion at the end of AI of Peace seem to me a correlation to prudentia, related to human action. Peace is supposed to show the way for civilisation to reach its goals. "Apart from it, the pursuit of 'Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art' can be ruthless, hard cruel…and thus… lacking in some essential quality of civilisation." AI 284) Only peace

grants 'that Harmony of Harmonies which calms destructive turbulence and completes civilization'. (AI 285)

The parallels extend to the thomistic vision of the highest prudentia.

First Part of the Second Part, Question: 61, Article: 5 :

"As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him

we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may

be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance

is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the

observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).

Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are

on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as

nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude

prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the

way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus

prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine

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[5] Pieper, 20

Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection."

Notice how close this is to Whitehead: Peace 'is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet momentous in its coodination of values…Thus Peace carries with it a surpassing of personality..There is thus involved a grasp of infinitude, an appeal remote'. (AI 285)
Therefore, the abstract description of morality can be described as follows:
"Morality is always the aim at that union of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of importance for that occasion." (MT 14)

B) Evil

Is there adequate room to define evil in such a system of synthesis?
History gives ample instances of moral failure.
Plato describes Eros as the force which drives the Universe towards perfection. Whitehead remarks: "It is obvious that he should have written a companion dialogue which might have been named The Furies, dwelling on the horrors lurking within imperfect realization." (AI 148)
Whiehead's standpoint, as far as evil is concerned, seems pretty clear. Can the same be said for a systematic approach concerning evil in his system?
Whitehead defines evil when there is 'destruction as a dominant fact in the experience' (AI 258) The tragic forms of Beauty, but of Evil as well have been described in AI.
An explicit description of moral evil is not evident. For moral evil, the general definition of evil has to be considered and the responsibility which each individual has for itself and for its acts. Moral evil is not only not denied but emphasized in several places. (e.G. 8th and 9th . categoreal obligation): "The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the future." (PR 27)
If evil is so obviously there what, is the actual reason for its existence?
Any subject can shut its eyes to the future completely or partially and be only focused on its present self. This form of action creates the realm of evil. (see RM 92-96, 149 and ch XVII of AI). The individual can consciously distort or dismiss the vision of an overall perspective. In analogy to a theory of virtues for the single individual a theory of vice could be developed. (It has been developed to some extent in the Middle Ages, Lasterkataloge: catalogues of vices) If the courage for adventure and new experiences is lacking, the subject mises out on its potential to direct the stream of being ideally. "Instead of a painting only a fragment."(RM 92), rigid habits turn out to be detrimental to moral life.
If the past or the immedeate present time dominates, it either blocks or deters the actual processes and becomes a decisive factor for the emergence of evil. Another major factor for the emergence of evil is, as mentioned above, the choice of a telos which is destructive.
The aesthetic concept of good and evil could suggest that it allowes the sacrifice of human beings for the sake of the higher or highest telos. Whitehead denies this categorially: "The Worth of any social system depends on the value experience it promotes among individual human beings." (AESP 124)
Is this claim systematically justfiable in a Whiteheadian system?
The human being, according to Whitehead, has the highest and most frequent possible contrasts, which means that it is the highest possible form of beauty, which can ever be achieved. Therefore, he is in agreement with Kant who, defined human dignity as an absolute value:
„ For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must
treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case

at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic
union of rational being by common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom
which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in
view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and
means. It is certainly only an ideal." (Kant, FM III, 54)

III. GOD'S RELATION TO GOOD AND EVIL IN WHITEHEAD'S RELATIONAL VALUE - ETHICS

Whitehead did not want his metaphysal endeavor to be biased by religious or ethical interests, as he thought had happened with Aristotle. Only a dispassionate examination of metaphysical topics makes sense.(SMW 215) On the other hand, Whitehead does not deny the legitimacy of developing an ethics within metaphysics, only it should not be allowed to distort the metaphysical thinking.

The conflict which every epoch faces is the desire to cling to its achievements.[6] What may look like stability, in facts, a slow process of atrophy. (FR 82) Both good and evil are positive elements in the process of experiencing. The difference between them lies in their relation to their surroundings. 'Evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative.' (RM 83)

Good and evil can be distinguished with respect to their formal aspects, their objective side. They can be judged by an aesthetic standard in such a way that the synthesizing of different elements becomes more beautiful, the more the elemnts are apart or drifting apart. The irreconcilability of different elements is the character of evil.[7]

To this external process, an internal one, one of feeling is correlated. It is the subjective side of experience. The more contrasting the elemnts are which enter into the occasion, the stronger is the intensity of satisfaction of the actual entities involved.

The highest form of contrasting, which includes any possible form of good and evil, happens in the actual entity, God.

God's ubiquity makes it possible for every actual entity to grasp the highest form of beauty, i.e. the good, as well as its opposite, evil, in its higest intensity of satisfaction, which means , that each actual entity has always criteria to judge ethical values in its subjective as well as its objective aspect.

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[6] PR 340; ef. also MT 119: „The essence of life is to be found in the frustrations of established order. The universe refuses the deadening influence of complete conformity. And yet m its refüsal, it passes towards novel order as a primary requisite for important experience."

[7] Cf. for a more detailed deseription of good and evil in its objective as weil as its subjecfive side, H.Maaßen, *Gott, das Gute und das Böse in der Philosophie A.N.Whiteheads,* Frankfurt 1988, pp.84-l28.

Each actual entity and each person, for that matter, doesn't start from nothing (E. Bloch, Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie: Wir fangen nicht leer an). Historical memory mediates forms, to which ethical predicates are attributed, e.g. the virtues, or structures of society, which are supposed to enable people with different interests to live together.[8] Each agent has, in principle, the possibility of judging each value with the standard, with which each was necessarily provided. This standard is not only in God, but in every actual entity since. Past actual entities reveal which values had leed to a synthesis, to contrasts or to the disintegration of a culture.

The highest standard concerning its objective as well as its ojective side is in God.

In the process of concrescense, each actual entity anticipates its subjective aim, related to its surroundings, rooted in past actual entities. Thus it develops itself in relation to its past und to its future universe. In this, God grants the plentitude of the past and the vision of the future.

The values, relationally determined, guide the processes of the actual entities.

They emerge in the interplay of God's ideal vision and the self determination of the actual entities. In the macrocosmic and the microcosmic processes, values can be judged by a general standard. Importance suffices objective as well as subjective criteria for their distinction. Good, therefore, is not only definable in its own terms. (in contrast to G.E.Moore's claim in Pincipia Ethica)

Along with the abstract definition of values by contrast and intensity, one can also find concrete (historical) definitions of good and evil.[9] In analogy to Whitehead's evaluation and critique of leading ideas in civilisation (in AI), one could undertake the same task for virtues. For virtue would be valid what Kant already claimed that they "... never become customary, but always spring anew and originally out of thinking".[10]

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[8] Whitehead does not analyse these basic structures of order, but it shows itself as a possibility in his essays on social philosophy.
[9] CF. Maaßen, ibid.

[10] Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.* Werke, ed. by W.Weischedel, Vol. 10, p437., trans. by H.M.; cf. Kant, *ANTHROPOLGY.* From a Pragmatic Point of View. translated by Victor Lyle Dowdell, Revised and ed. by Hans H.Rudnick. With an Introduction by Frederick P.Van De Pitte, Southern Illinois University Press, p. 32.

The boundaries between animals and human beings, eradicated by Whitehead, could nevertheless prove useful for ethical purposes of a historical consideration of iustice, virtue etc., without denying the justness of Whitehead's intention.

The importance of religious intuition should not be oberstimated. Although it might reveal 'wholeness'(as it happens in mystical experience), Whitehead himself in *Process and Reality* limited the importance of religious feelings altogether: "The concept of God is certainly one essential element in religious feeling. But the converse is not true; the concept of religious feeling is not an essential element in the concept of God's function in the universe." (PR207)

1. God and the Moral Good and Evil

a) God's limited power as the conditon of the possibility of moral
 good and evil

God's power is limited threefold. First, God influences any new emerging new actual entity as an actual entity among other entities. In this process, He exercises - as any other actual entity - causal efficacy.[11] "His superjective nature contributes causal efficacy as any other actual entity.[12] For the emerging actual entity, this means that it can allow God's influence in a self determining way, to exert his influence fully or through negative prehension, to reduce it to its minimum.

God's influence as an actual entity is limited by the self determination of each subject, which is influenced causally by him. Through this, each actual entity is granted the possibility enrichment through the wealth of the past and the vision which might result out of it (i.e. God's consequent and primordial nature). The prolificity, contrast and intensity enable it to reach the best possible good. On the other hand, it can reduce - for its perspective of the micro- and macrocosmic process - the fullnes of the actual entity, God, to a minimum, which would then necessarily lead to triviality, obstruction or destruction.

The second aspect of limitation is related to God's immediacy. Only when objectified, is an actual entity able to influence another actual entity, which means, that even God cannot be felt in His immediacy, but can only be physically felt as a superject (this point has been stressed by

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[11]Cf. PR *65,* 88. Cf. as well the notes by A.H.Johnson ɪn: *Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy,* ed. by L.S.Ford and G.L.Kline, New York 1983, pp. 3-l3. In this, Whitehead stresses God's causal efficacy as an actual entity.

[12] Ibid. p.8.

Robert Neville, when dicussing Whitehead's religious adequacy, which I am not dealing with in this paper). Vice versa, God can only reach His immediacy, if the ingressing actual entity loses its immediacy.[13]

The separation of actual entities from each other, i.e. the separation of the actual entity, God, from every other actual entity as well, ensures each subjects (though limited) independence and results when ingressing into another occasion in its loss of immediacy: either God loses His immediacy in His ingression into another actual entity or any actual entity loses its immediacy in its ingression into God.

Thirdly, God depends on other actual entities, separated from Him, insofar as He only can become real through them (see PR 349/350). He is - so to speak - granted causal efficacy (limited though it may be) through other actual entities. Although His primordial nature yearns after realization, it cannot achieve it by itself. God depends on the actual entities, separated from Him, and He is at the same time delivered unto them, He prehends all actual entities, good or bad, which is to say, God does not prehend negatively.(PR 345).

The question wether such a concept of God's limited power is compatible with traditional views of God's omnipotence has been widely discussed elsewhere, but cannot be gone into in this paper.[14]

b) God's modus operandi concerning moral good and evil:

persuasion and presevation

In the process of concrescense of actual entities, God functions as one actual entity among others. His special function, though, is that all past actual entities reach everlastingness in him (PR 345), He garanties the (objectified) presence of all past occasions.[15] "We owe to the sense

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[13] Cf. the 24.th Category of Explanation.

[14] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity. A Social Conception of God, New Haven 1948, esp. pp. 134-l42 and Omnipotence and other Theological Mistakes, Albany 1984, pp.lO-26; E.H.Madden/P.H.Hare, Evil and unlimited Power, in; Review ofMetaphysics 20 (1966), pp. 278-289; M.B.Ahorn, The Problem ofEvil, London 1971 and D.R. Griffin, God, Power and Evil: A Process Theodicy, Philadelphia 1976.

[15] Cf. the detailed description in W.A.Christian, *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics,* New Haven 1967, pp. 322-33O.

of Deity the obviousness of the many actualities of the world, and the obviousness of the unity of the world."[16]

In RM Whitehead states: "Since God is actual, He must include in himself a synthesis of the total universe." (RM 85)

Since God has prehended all past actual entities, He is able to supply the initial aim for each actual entity most adequate to its own past and future.[17]

Supplying the subjective aims for actual entities is God's way of influencing the world as a superject. Since each actual entity is always caus sui as well, it is able to modify its subjective aim (PR 86,88).

This limited influence of God in the concrescense of actual entities may be comparable as well to 'the Galilean origin of Christianity' which 'does not emphezise the ruling Caesar, or the ruthles moralist, or the unmoved mover'. (PR343)

"The life of Christ is not an exhibition of over-ruling power. Its glory is for those who can discern it, and not for the world. Its power lies in its absence of force. It has the decisiveness of the supreme ideal, and that is why the history of the world divides at this point of time." (RM47)

Each actual entity thus has a moral ideal as well, provided by God's vision. Without Him, this vision would be impossible (RM 140). The actual entity decides itself how far it will follow this ideal in the process of becoming. It can be judged by the importance, i.e. the degree of intensity and contrast, which the actual entity promotes.[18]

Concerning the perished and perishing, God has a preserving function. In His consequent nature, He preserves all (past) actual entities and endows them, through this, with immortality.[19]

For those, who do something good, or at least try to do so it may be consoling to achieve immortality in God (nonetheless an objective immortality, not a subjective one); the unsuccessful attempt is so met by God 'with a novel consequent as to issue in the restoration of goodness'(RM 139). The victims of evil achieve everlastingness and value in God and the importance, which they deserve in the overall process of reality.

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[16] MT 140: This is, by the way, a thought found in the later Plato, especially in the Philebus, and recently in Paul Weiss and Robert C. Neville, where Plato in this later dialogue might discuss Aristotele's criticism of his earlier conception of ιδέα)

[17] Cf. D.W.Sherburne, *A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality,* Bloomington 1966, p. 244.

[18] Cf. the ist. Chapter, „Importance", of MT, pp.l-27.

[19] Cf. part III.4 of Maaßen, loc. cit.; PR 347, 351 and Whitehead's lecture *,Immortality'.*

But can God ingress evil itself into himself that is, into everything without distinction? Then, it would seem that Whitehead's description of God as a loving, fellow-sufferer, limited through His goodness, would be empty, without any possibility of determination; he would then have seriously neglected the fact, which one can find in his own writings: "To be an actual thing is to be limited." (RM 144)

Can God be real and at the same time ingress everthing good and evil without distinction and so overcome it?

2. Good and Evil in the concrescense of the actual entity God

While in SMW Whitehead assumed, that it is in God's nature to 'separate good from evil'(SMW 223) he changes this conception already in RM: "The kingdom of heaven is not the isolation of good from evil." (RM 139) But how can one think of God's goodness and the morally and radical evil as being prehended by God (i.e. his consequent nature)?

Some passages in RM seem to indicate that Whitehead denies the existence of radical evil. If evil, particularly moral evil, is fully overcome, or even more so when 'Its very evil becomes a stepping stone in the all-embracing ideals of God'(RM 140), then this points towards the abandonment of any ethical thinking as well as action.

In contrast to the conception that God will smooth out everything[20], Whitehead explicitly stresses God's function as a judge (PR346). God's judgement can be irrevocable. "The chaff is burnt."(PR 244). If God does not prehend negatively, how can Whitehead say, 'The revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding, are dismissed into their triviality of mere individual facts...'(PR 346)?

If God's consequent nature, His judgement of the world, is of such tender patience, 'which loses nothing that can be saved', does that also allow the assumption of a radical evil, which cannot be saved?

Whitehead's statements on this can be interpreted in more than one way. Even if one takes into consideration that Whitehead tries to avoid fixed borders between categories, there is the danger of not being able to distinguish between a responsible subject, moral good and evil, on the one hand, and elementary good and evil on the other hand, in their mutual interrelation with God in the development of an ethics out of Whitehead's cosmology.

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[20] AI 15: "For both sets of thinkers God has been a great resource: a lot of things which won't work on Earth, can be conceived as true in his sight."

This unclarity becomes evident in A.H.Johnson's manuscript, too, where Whitehead says: "While there is no elimination within God's nature as such - there is of course elimination of some of the data available for inclusion in God's nature."[21]

How can one think God's nature, which creates unity, therefore without negative prehensio, and at the same time moral evil, if it holds, that 'selection is at once the measure of evil, and the process of its evasion'(PR340)?

It seems to me that Whitehead tries to understand evil as negation of being and at the same time to understand it as a kind of being (MT 74). All reality, even moral evil, is enclosed in God's consequent nature. "Since God is actual, He must include in himself a synthesis of the total universe."(RM 85). In his consequent nature 'there is no loss, no obstruction. The world is felt in a unison of immediacy.'(PR 346) God's consequent nature 'is that of a tender care that nothing be lost'.

It seems to me that it would solve the problems raised, if one were to understand God, as often demanded[22], as an actual entity.[23]

The ingression of good and evil into the actual entity, God, therefore, will be described as the process of concrescense, as it happens in any actual entity.

a) the conformal phase

Each actual entity starts with physical prehension. "It is a feeling *from* the cause which aquires the subjectivity of the new effect without loss of its original subjectivity in the cause." (PR 237/8) The simple physical feelings embody the re-productive character of nature and the objective immortality, insofar as the past is reproduced in something new. Whitehead, therefore, calls this phase of concretion the conformal phase (PR 212). The simple physical feeling is named 'reactivation', 'reproduction' and 'adaptation'(PR 238).

This is supposed to be valid for God as well. This is what Whitehead's different statements are referring to, when he says that God is the 'fellow-suffer who understands', that nothing 'gets lost, that can be saved'.

Simple physical causal or simple physical feeling of each actual entity, God included, can be called perfect, insofar as every actual entity in a subject's real world will ingress into that subject's concrescense by some simple physical feeling, 'however vague, trivial, and submerged'

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[21] A.H.Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality, New York 1962, p.217.

[22] E.g. M.Welker, *Universalität Gottes und Relativität der Welt,* Neukirchen-Vluyn 1988[2], p.134.
[23] Cf. the classical interpretation by W.A.Christian, loc. Cit.

(PR 239). Each actual entity provides in its concrescense ogjective immortality for all the actual occassions of its real world.

God differs from the other actual entities in that he starts with his mental pole, while all other actual entities start with their physical pole (PR 36 et al). But even in this context, Whitehead says:

" Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings." (PR 224)

Each process of concretion can be understood as a teleological process, to which its telos is given, and, in this sense, not only God starts with his mental pole. But even if one considers the differences to be stronger than this parallel suggests, still the *conformal* phase apllies to all actual entities in the described way, God included. Differences are indicated only in the following phase, the supplemental phase.

b) The supplemental phase

In the supplemental phase, three forms of feelings are dinstinguishable: conceptual feelings, simple comparative and complex comparative feelings.[24]

While the actual entities of a subject's real world have to ingress into it' this does not apply to the forms of the processes; pure potentials can be dismissed (PR239).

Only the forms give reality the character of 'This" and 'That". "The definiteness of the actual arises from the exclusiveness of eternal objects in their functions as determinants...The fact of incompatile alternatives is the ultimate fact in virtue of which there is definite character." (PR 240) The dismissal of eternal objects happens in the process of concrescense, because in conceptual feeling eternal objects can be dismmissed from influencing the concrescense (negative prehension) and through the fact, that positively prehended eternal objects exclude others from ingression. This does not apply to the actual entity, God, since he is supposed to be the 'reservoir' of potentiality.[25]

God's primordial nature is the absolute and complete realm of eternal objects (PR 31, 32, 164). God does not prehend negatively; his conceptual prehension is 'unlimited' (PR 346). The

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[24] Cf. the diagram in D.W.Sherburne, loc. cit. p. 40

[25] MT 128; cf. Ford/Kline (ed.) loc. cit. p.5

reservoir of potentiality, though, should not be misunderstood as if there were a fixed class of eternal objects.

"For if we conceive any class of eternal objects, there are additional eternal objects which presuppose that class but do not belong to it."(PR 46)

Therefore, Whitehead talks of the multiplicity of forms and of a class of forms. There is no one ideal order of eternal objects(PR 84), in the realm of eternal objects (God's primordial nature) there is, one might say, no emperor.[26]

The realm of eternal objects is ordered for each actual entity in a specific way. Each specific order of the eternal objects is achieved by its relation to a definite concrescense of a definite actual entity. While each actual occasion gets its definiteness by dismissing eternal objects (Spinozas 'determinatio est negatio[27]) this does not apply to God, he includes all eternal objects, but he achieves his definiteness by a limitation, which is the definiteness of the actual occasions which ingress into him;, through this, pure potentiality (which Whitehead calls abstract or general potentiality as well[28]) turns into real potentiality.[29]

God's definiteness is, therefore, derivative; since he cannot attain it by negative prehension, i.e. limitation of his own possibilities, it is reached by the ingression of definite and limited actual entities. This necessary determination, without which God would lack actuality, can be attained through good and evil, perpetrator and victim; insofar as the one or the other cause God's determinateness, they become part of God without exception.[30]

As stated before, this corresponds to the conformal phase, in which no (physical) feeling can be dismissed.

God's passion and conformity with each feeling is complete and perfect.[31] Each feeling is experienced exactly as what it was and what it is, without judging or distorting it, without exaggeration or dimunition, a perfect re-production, re-activation takes place. But the process of

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[26] Christian, loc. cit. p. 273; cf PR 84.

[27] Spinoza, Letter Nr.20 to Jarig Jelles, dated 2nd. June 1674.

[28] 5th. Category of Existence, PR 22.

[29] 6th. Category of Existence, PR 23.

[30] This reminds one of S.Alexander, Space, Time and Deiiy, 2 vols., London 19272, Vol.11, P.419: „Value is in the above sense conserved in deity. But withal we have to recognize that, not in deity, but in God, unvalues also are contained..."

[31] See Christian, loc. cit. p.35l.

concrescense does not end here. Directed towards its telos, satisfaction, conceptual feelings are added to the physical feelings in such a way that they would fit in with the actual entity's subjective aim through conceptual valuations, propositional feelings, which, in the end, might lead to feelings of contrast as consciousness.[32]

The physical data, which may be culprit and victim, good and evil, which exclude each other in reality or are excluded therein, ingress into God's consequent nature. God's vision encloses all eternal objects, all possible contrasts are felt with the highest intensity by Him. All contrasts in the objective lure for feeling are felt. Even those eternal objects of different actual entities, which they excluded, will be included in God. God's conceptual supplementation of the physical data, which have become part of him, is complete and perfect. Only in this way is He able to integrate all physical feelings which otherwise exclude each other (PR 346).

Those initially puzzling phrases of Whitehead, that 'every event on its finer side introduces God' (RM 140), or that 'pleasure and joy, sorrow and pain' are 'stepping stones in the all-embracing ideals of god'(s.o.) make sense now.

Good and evil are not synthesized and reconciled in a dark way as part of this real world, but God creates an ***'ideal supplement'*** for each of them : for evil, so that evil, with its ideal supplement, becomes a contrast, as well as for the good, with its ideal supplement. Good and evil, as such, become part of God's nature, but they are not revoked. Each 'ideal supplement' proves the evil in absolute clarity as that what is, as it does with the good.

"The concept of impossibility such that God himself cannot surmount it, has been for centuries quite familiar with theologians. Indeed, apart from it there would be difficulty in conceiving any determinate divine nature. But curiously enough so far as I know, this notion of incompatibility has never been applied to ideals in the Divine realization. We must conceive the Divine Eros as the active entertainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season. Thus a process must be inherent in God's nature, whereby his infinity is acquiring realization." (AI 357)

c)Satisfaction

God's satisfaction, as in any concrescense, is to reach its telos.[33] Once it is reached, it is a fully determined satisfaction (PR 85). In this way, creativity enters the primary phase of another actual entity. Actual entities, insofar as they ingress into God, influence God in a particular way. "The philosophy of organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction."(PR 88)

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[32] Cf. the diagram in E.M.Kraus, The Metaphysies of Experience. A Companion to Whitehead's Process and Reality, New York 1979, p.ll8 and Chapter X (Process) in Part 11 of PR.

[33] Cf. Part III.3 of Maaßen, loc. cit.

Whitehead nowhere describes exactly how this process takes place, nor how it happens in the actual entity God and especially what would follow out of this for the ingression of good and evil.

God's satisfaction is a complete feeling, which, as for any other subjective form, has a qualitative pattern and a pattern of intensive quantity (PR 233). To answer the question how actual ocassions influence God's feelings, one has to distinguish these two factors.

The qualitative pattern of his feelings is, without doubt, influenced by other actual occasions; they, in fact, generate his definiteness (see above). But do the actual occasions influence the intensity of God's satisfaction as well? What would follow from this for the ingression of good and evil into God?

Physical feelings belong to God's satisaction and they are given by actual entities: joy and sorrow, good and evil, etc., and his conceptual feelings, which supplement the physical ones. This is similar to a concept developed by Samuel Alexander in his Gifford Lectures from 1914-1918, Space, Time and Deity:

"Value is in the above sense conserved in deity, but withal we have to recognize that, not in deity, but in God, unvalues also are contained...
Though God's deity is in the line of value, it involves evil as well as good in its substructure. Evil is, therefore, redeemed as part of God's being, of the matter of him. And since the whole of his body supports deity, what is evil from the lower material level (the human level) undergoes change so as to support the divine...Thus evil is at once a reality and has its finite existence, and by being resolved into the infinite whole out of which it sprang it undergoes alteration into value..." [34]

The supplementation of the physical prehensions through God's conceptual prehension is unlimited, sice God does not prehend negatively. He creates the unity of his satisfaction not by dismissal, unlike all other actual occasions, but by his conceptual supplement.[35] His conceptual supplementation is unlimited, because He includes all eternal objects in His primordial nature (PR 343 et al).

Contrasts, on which the intensity of the satisfaction depends (e.g. PR 278) are created through the conceptual supplement of sometimes irreconciliable data of physical prehension (e.g. perpetrator and victim). The irreconciliability of good and evil, perpetrator and victim, is not synthesized in God into a contrast, but physical feelings are synthesized with conceptual ones.

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[34] That it is logically possible, has been shown by Roderick Chisholm, The Defeat of Good and Evil, in: contemporary American Philosophy, Second Series, ed. by John E. Smith, London/New York 1970, pp. 152-169.

[35] L.S.Ford, „The Non-Temporality of Whitehead's God, in: Intern. Philosophical Quaterly 13 (1973), pp.347-376, esp. p349.

From this, it follows, that the intensity of God's satisfaction is independent of the physical data which enter into his being.

He depends on physical data to ingress into him, otherwise he could not achieve satisfaction. If some data enter his concrescense, He generates, through his unlimited conceptual supplement, the highest possible intensity of satisfaction, which can be distinguished with regard to its qualitative pattern. It is initiated by the different physical data, but they do not influence its intensity.

'The absolute standard of such intensity is that of the primordial nature of God, which is neither great nor small because it arises out of no actual world. It has within it no components which are standards of comparison."(PR 47)

If the intensity of God's satisfaction is independent of the kind of actual occasions which enter him, if His intensity is generated by the contrast of His physical and conceptual feelings, then S.L.Ely's major alligation , that God reaches more joy through incorporating good and evil as contrasts, which would make God more of a Sadist as anything else, is not tenable.[36]

d) God as Subject-Superject: His Effect on the Future

Although God's intensity of satisfaction is not altered by the actual occasions which enter him, they still have an effect beyond him.

As shown earlier, the ingressing actual occasios do not influence God's intensity of satisfaction; they do, however, change its qualitative pattern. Through this, they determine the structure of the subjective aim which God provides for future occasions: "For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience." (PR 351) The special providence of God for special occasions, which Whitehead mentions in the following passage, means, therefore, that past evil causes a special conceptual prehension in God, which then fashions the structure for new intial data for actual occasions. God's influence is exercised not by physical force, but through the provision definite new ideals for future events. In this sense, one has to understand Whitehead's claim of God's love for the world.

(Notice how close this is to the Platonic doctrine in the Timaios, "He does not create the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience 'leading /persuading /swaying' it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness'(PR346) in which, among other similarities, the exact aquivalent for 'leading /persuading /swaying' can be found: πείθειν. I

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[36] Ely's classical critique „The Religious Availabiity of Whitehead's God" (1942) has been reprinted in Ford/Kline (ed.) loc. cit. pp. 170-211.

have shown this in my recent article: Revelation, Myth and Metaphysics, published in Materialen zu *Process and Reality*,Vol. 2, *Die Gifford Lectures und ihre Deutungen*, ed. by Michael Hampe und Helmut Maaßen, Suhrkamp 1991, pp.217-233)

God is the fellow-sufferer, because evil partakes of God.[37] This is only possible, if the last two pages of *Process and Reality* are strictly interpreted as the four phases of the concrescense of the actual entity, God.

Whitehead's cosmology thus proves to be logically consistent and coherent with respect to the concept of good and evil. This means, that it is possible to construct a Whiteheadian ethics as a relational value ethics.

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[37] In this I agree with D.R.Griffln, loc. cit. p.305.